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Abstract 
The  f inanc i a l  de f i c i t s  o f  many  soc i a l  s ecu r i t y  s y s t ems  caused  by  age ing  
popu l a t ions  and  s t agna t ing  economies  a r e  fo rc ing  worke r s  to  r e t i r e  l a t e r  f rom the  
l abour  marke t .  An  ex tended  work ing  l i f e  comb ined  w i th  r ap id  t e chno log i c a l  
p rog re s s  in  many  s ec to r s ,  i s  l i k e l y  mak ing  o lde r  worke r s ’  sk i l l s  ob ta ined  in  s choo l  
obso l e t e .  In  th i s  con tex t ,  l i f e long  inves tmen t  in  t r a in ing  i s  w ide l y  r ecogn ized  
among  the  in t e rna t iona l  r e s ea rch  and  po l i c y  commun i t y  a s  a  key  e l emen t  to  
inc rea se  o r  a t  l e a s t  l im i t  the  dec l ine  in  p roduc t i v i t y  o f  o lde r  worke r s .  Th i s  pape r  
inves t i g a t e s  the  r e l a t ionsh ip  be tween  t r a in ing  unde r t aken  by  European  o lde r  
worke r s  and  the i r  wages ,  r e l y ing  on  the  Su rvey  o f  Hea l th ,  Age ing  and  Re t i r emen t  
in  Europe .   
Under t ak ing  t r a in ing  a c t i v i t i e s  i s  a s soc i a t ed  w i th  6 .3% h ighe r  wages .  Th i s  
p rem ium i s  s i z eab l e  and  i s  s im i l a r  to  tha t  o f  a t t a in ing  an  upper  o r  pos t - s econda ry  
deg ree  in s t e ad  o f  a  p r imary  o r  lower - s econda ry  deg ree .  T ra in ing  wage  p rem iums  
a r e  h igh l y  he t e rogeneous  a c ros s  coun t r i e s :  they  a r e  h i ghes t  in  Aus t r i a ,  Germany ,  
Greece ,  and  I t a l y  and  a r e  abou t  ha l f  tha t  in  F rance  and  Spa in .  No  p rem ium i s  
found  fo r  Denmark ,  Sweden ,  Be lg ium ,  the  Ne the r l ands ,  and  Sw i t ze r l and .  T ra in ing  
p rem iums  o f  the  f i r s t  g roup  o f  coun t r i e s  c an  be  ove re s t ima ted  due  to  t r a in ing  
endogene i t y  and  s amp le  s e l e c t ion  b i a s .  
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 1 
Introduction 
The long-term increase in longevity that many countries are experiencing is a direct reflection of the 
success of our societies in securing higher living standards. Such increasing life expectancy, 
together with low economic growth, has, however, put pressure on the financial equilibrium of 
many pay-as-you-go pension systems in Europe and in other industrialised countries. Governments 
have therefore often been forced to increase the average retirement age out of the labour force by 
either limiting access to early retirement or making early exit routes less attractive (e.g. Gruber and 
Wise 2004). An extended working life – combined with the rapid technological progress in many 
sectors – is likely making older workers’ skills obtained in school obsolete. In this context, lifelong 
investment in training is widely recognised among the international research and policy community 
as a key element to increase or at least limit the decline in productivity of older workers (e.g. OECD 
2006). 
The theoretical foundations of the effect of training on worker productivity lie in human capital 
theory (Becker 1964, 1993). According to this theory, training activities (and education) are 
investments, since they are undertaken to increase individuals’ stock of knowledge, skills, 
competencies, and abilities, which are important elements of human capital. An individual’s 
decision to invest in training is based upon a comparison of the net present value of costs (i.e. direct 
training costs and lower wages while in training) and the net present value of benefits (i.e. higher 
marginal product and higher wages) of such an investment. Individuals invest in training during a 
period and obtain returns to the investment in subsequent periods: The longer the residual working 
life, the more advantageous the investment in training. One of the main predictions of this model is 
therefore that both participation and returns to training decline with increasing age and approaching 
retirement. Generous early retirement schemes may therefore discourage participation in training 
aimed at older workers (Fouarge and Schils 2009). When analysing older workers, it is particularly 
relevant to distinguish between general and specific training. General training develops transferable 
skills that the trainee can bring to another firm, while specific training improves skills targeted to 
the firm in which the trainee works. Human capital models predict that while the workers receive all 
the returns to general training (and therefore they pay for it), employees and employers share the 
returns (and costs) to specific training. 
Great research efforts have been dedicated to empirically test the predictions of human capital 
theory. A branch of this literature evaluates the effect of training on productivity indirectly, by 
means of its effect on workers’ wages. It assumes that wages are a sufficient statistic for 
productivity (Dearden et al. 2006) and often relies on the traditional neoclassical labour market 
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model with perfectly competitive wages (noticeable exceptions are Acemoglu and Pischke 1999 and 
Dostie and Leger 2011). Positive effects of training on wages are commonly found for most 
European countries, as well as for the United States. Nevertheless, the size of the estimated effect 
varies widely across countries and is very sensitive to the data and analytical methods used. 
Extended empirical literature on this topic exists for the United Kingdom, where estimated returns 
to training range from 1% (Booth 1993) to 18% (Booth, 1991). Positive effects of training on wages 
are found for Norway (1% increase, Shone 2004), Switzerland (2%, Gerfin 2004), and Portugal 
(30%, Budria and Pereira 2007). The results for Germany (cf. no return in Pischke 2001, with 5% 
return in Mühler, Beckmann, and Schauenberg 2007) and France (cf. no return in Goux and Maurin 
2000, with positive return for job switchers in Fougère et al. 2001) are less clear. 
Due to different concepts and definitions of training across countries and datasets, the comparability 
of results across countries is limited. A few studies circumvent some of these limitations by 
exploiting cross-country data (see OECD 1999; OECD 2004). Bassanini et al. (2007) estimate a 
positive impact of training on earnings for most of the analysed countries; this return ranges from 
3.7% for the Netherlands to 21.6% for Greece and is sensitive to the statistical method employed. 
Some papers investigate the differentials in training returns (and incidence) between younger and 
older workers (Booth 1991, Warr and Fay 2001, Bassanini 2006, Bassanini et al. 2007, Lang 2012, 
Dostie and Leger 2011). These studies mostly confirm human capital theory predictions, showing 
lower returns for older workers compared to younger ones. To our knowledge, there are no studies 
focusing on older adults from an international perspective. 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between training undertaken by workers aged 50 and 
above and their wages. We rely on the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE), which provides information on wages and training for European individuals aged 50+. 
Besides its specific focus on older adults, this source of data is particularly suitable for international 
studies due to its wide country coverage and harmonisation in the definition of training in the 
country questionnaires. We perform a wide sensitivity analysis to check whether our results are 
affected by unobserved ability, attrition and sample selection (exclusion of individuals retiring or 
becoming unemployed between waves) biases. 
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Data and empirical strategy 
This study relies on data from SHARE (www.share-project.org), a multidisciplinary and cross-
national panel database of micro data on health, socioeconomic status (SES), and social and family 
networks. The target population consists of individuals aged 50+ who speak the official language of 
each country and do not live abroad or in an institution, as well as their spouses or partners, 
irrespective of age. Four waves of SHARE are currently available. The baseline study (interview 
years 2004–2005) covers 11 European countries representing different regions of continental 
Europe, from Scandinavia (Denmark and Sweden) through Central Europe (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) to the Mediterranean countries (Greece, Italy, 
and Spain). Additional countries joined the survey in the following waves. The third wave of 
SHARE (conducted in 2008–2009), called SHARELIFE, was a retrospective life history survey. 
This study exploits two key variables reconstructed from the first two waves of SHARE: hourly 
wages and participation in training activities. Hourly wages are measured from the second wave of 
the survey. A set of variables concerning employees’ current main job is included in the 
‘Employment and Pension’ module of this wave, which comprises the following: i) last payment 
taken home from work, ii) frequency of payment (‘How often do you get paid?’: ‘Every week’, 
‘every two weeks’, …, ‘every year’), and iii) total hours worked per week. We reconstruct hourly 
wages, net of taxes (Flores and Kalwij, 2013), dividing net wages – obtained by combining i) and 
ii) – by the number of hours worked – from iii). Unfolding bracket values for last payment taken 
home from work are used to reduce the number of missing values. 
Participation in training activities is retrieved from the first wave of SHARE for those employees 
whose hourly wages in the second wave of the survey (i.e. one to three years later) could be 
reconstructed. To measure training participation, we exploit a question (part of the module 
‘Activities’) that asks interviewees whether they attended any educational or training courses in the 
last four weeks. We note, however, that this question does not permit differentiation between 
general and specific training. No information on the length of the training course is gathered.  
As mentioned above, we consider individuals surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2, that is, about 18,000 
respondents. About one-third of the baseline sample is lost due to attrition between the first and 
second waves of the survey. Further focusing on employees in both waves leads to a selection of 
4,304 individuals, since retired individuals represent roughly half of the samples in both waves. 
Note that about 13% of employees in Wave 1 who were re-interviewed in Wave 2 retired between 
the two waves. Moreover, an additional 6% became unemployed, permanently sick, or 
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homemakers. We also note that transition out of employment is not random with respect to training: 
14% (3%) of untrained workers in Wave 1 moved to retirement (unemployment), compared to only 
8% (2%) of trained workers. We return to these issues later. 
Information on wages is available for 3,824 individuals, including 136 whose wages were imputed 
using bracket values. To account for outliers, we exclude the top and bottom 1% of the hourly wage 
distribution obtained, as well as individuals working fewer than 15 hours or more than 70 hours per 
week (i.e. about 10% of the residual sample). Finally, excluding observations for which either 
weights or control variables are missing leads to a final estimation sample of 2,312 individuals. 
Based on these data, we estimate the following equation for (the logarithm of) wages: 
 log !!! = !!!! + !!!! + !!!        (1) 
 
where log !!!  is the logarithm of net hourly wages of individual i at the time of Wave 2 (i.e. in 
either 2006 or 2007), x is a vector of exogenous demographic and job-related individual 
characteristics, τ is a dummy variable equal to one if individual i participated in any training activity 
at the time of Wave 1 (i.e. in either 2004 or 2005), and ε is a random term that is assumed to satisfy 
the standard assumptions of independent and identically distributed variables. The key parameter to 
be estimated is γ, which measures the causal effect of training on wages if the above assumptions 
are satisfied. In the main empirical specification of equation (1), x includes a second-order 
polynomial for age, (log of) tenure, and dummy variables for the main International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED) educational groups, gender, whether working in the public or 
private sector, the country of residence, work sector, occupation – by one-digit International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) code – and year of interview. 
We estimate equation (1) with the method of ordinary least squares (OLS). An important 
shortcoming of OLS is that the estimate of  in equation (1) is consistent only if training is 
uncorrelated with the error term, conditional on the other covariates. This assumption does not hold 
if unobserved individual characteristics, such as ability, affect wages and are correlated with 
training. Since ability, training participation, and wages are expected to be positively correlated, 
neglecting such an omitted variable/selectivity problem can lead to overestimation of the return to 
training. The state of the art in this literature is to estimate fixed effects or first-differences versions 
of equation (1), where a time-invariant component is included in the error term. With these 
methods, one gets rid of individual unobserved characteristics as long as they are constant over time 
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(Wooldridge 2002). However, such models cannot be estimated with the data at our disposal, 
because we are not able to reconstruct hourly wages from the fourth wave of SHARE. Having had 
both hourly wages and delayed training participation at two points in time – that is, wages in Waves 
2 and 4 and training in Waves 1 and 2 – would have allowed estimation of a first-differences 
version of equation (1). To partly overcome this lack of data, we also present the results of 
augmented models that include proxy variables for ability taken from SHARELIFE. 
 
 
Results 
Figure 1 reports the distribution (of the logarithm) of hourly wages, by training status. It highlights 
that the distribution of trained workers’ hourly wages is somewhat shifted to the right with respect 
to that of untrained workers.  
Figure 1 – Distribution of log hourly wages, by training status 
  
Source: SHARE Wave 1-2 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics, by training status. Trained workers represent 17.8% (411 
individuals) of the estimation sample. On average, they receive higher wages than untrained 
workers; the difference between trained and untrained workers in terms of the mean of (the 
logarithm of) hourly wages (trained 2.68, s.d. 0.42; untrained 2.48, s.d. 0.45) is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Females (55% versus 43%) and public sector workers (28% versus 22%) 
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represent a significantly higher percentage of trained workers than of untrained workers. More than 
50% of trained workers have a tertiary education degree (ISCED 5–6), while only 10% have either 
no education (ISCED 0) or a primary or lower-secondary degree (ISCED 1–2). Among untrained 
workers, most (40%) have an upper or post-secondary education (ISCED 3–4), while 30% of this 
sample have a lower education (ISCED 0–2).  
 
Table 1. Estimation sample: descriptive statistics, by training status  
VARIABLES Untrained workers Trained workers 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
     
Log hourly wage 2.48 0.45 2.68 0.42 
Log tenure 2.84 0.91 2.93 0.88 
Female 0.43 0.50 0.55 0.50 
Age 54.89 3.63 54.45 3.30 
age^2 (/100) 30.26 4.12 29.75 3.67 
public sector 0.22 0.42 0.28 0.45 
Education (ISCED 97):     
No education (ISCED 0) 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.07 
Primary and lower-secondary education (ISCED 1-2) 0.28 0.45 0.09 0.29 
Upper and post-secondary education (ISCED 3-4) 0.40 0.49 0.39 0.49 
Tertiary education (ISCED 5-6) 0.29 0.46 0.51 0.50 
n. of observations 1901  411  
Source: SHARE Wave 1-2  
Note: Variables not reported: country of residence, sector, occupation and year of interview 
 
Figure 2 compares the training incidence and the difference between trained and untrained workers 
in the mean of the logarithm of hourly wages, by country. The latter variable can be seen as an 
uncorrected training wage premium at the country level. Two facts emerge from Figure 2. First, 
both variables are characterised by wide dispersion (thus, later we investigate to some extent the 
issue of country heterogeneity in training premium). Second, there is a negative association between 
them. This is in line with previous studies (e.g. Bassanini et al. 2007) that report evidence of a 
negative association between training incidence and return to training across countries at all 
working ages. 
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Figure 2 - Training incidence and difference between trained and untrained workers in the mean of 
log hourly wages, by country 
 
Source: SHARE Wave 1-2 
 
Table 2 shows the OLS parameter estimates of equation (1) for two specifications. Specification (a) 
assumes that the training wage premium is the same in all the analysed countries. Specification (b) 
relaxes this assumption of homogeneity across countries. Obviously, it would have been very 
informative to estimate country-specific premiums. However, this last exercise is not feasible given 
the small sample size and low training incidence observed in various countries included in our 
dataset. Therefore, starting from a flexible specification where the training variable is interacted 
with country dummies and relying on the descriptive evidence reported in Figure 2, we 
progressively combine countries showing similar results, obtaining groups of countries 
characterised by increasingly different training premiums. More parsimonious specifications were 
tested against more flexible ones. This procedure results in three country groups: 1) Austria, 
Germany, Greece, and Italy; 2) France and Spain; and 3) Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland. 
Table 2. Training wage premiums  
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VARIABLES (a) (b) 
      
Training (country group 1: AT, DE, GR, IT) 0.0634*** 0.193*** 
 (0.0215) (0.0293) 
Log tenure 0.0720*** 0.0685*** 
 (0.00875) (0.00854) 
Female -0.167*** -0.147*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0161) 
Public sector -0.0561*** -0.0580*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0196) 
Age – 50 0.0170*** 0.0142** 
 (0.00571) (0.00575) 
Age- 50 squared -0.00169*** -0.00128*** 
 (0.000428) (0.000432) 
No education (ISCED 0) -0.305*** -0.245*** 
 (0.0554) (0.0615) 
Primary and lower-secondary education (ISCED 1-2) -0.234*** -0.238*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0259) 
Upper and post-secondary education (ISCED 3-4) -0.162*** -0.158*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0194) 
Training * (country group 2: FR, ES)  -0.104* 
  (0.0602) 
Training * (country group 3 : DK, SE, BE, NL, CH)  -0.256*** 
  (0.0441) 
   
Wald test H0: no effect of training in country group 2 (p-value)  0.08 
Wald test H0: no effect of training in country group 3 (p-value)  0.17 
Observations 2,312 2,312 
R-squared 0.421 0.425 
Source: SHARE Waves 1-2  
Note: OLS estimates; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Additional controls: dummy 
variables for country of residence, sector, occupation and year of interview; Reference categories: private sector, 
tertiary education (ISCED 5-6), training in country group 1: AT, DE, GR, IT. 
 
Specification (a) shows that the estimate for the training variable is equal to 0.0634 and is 
significant at the 1% level: for employees aged 50 and above residing in one of the 11 analysed 
European countries, undertaking training activities is associated with 6.3% higher wages. This 
premium is sizeable and is similar to that of attaining an upper or post-secondary education degree 
(ISCED 3–4) instead of a primary or lower-secondary (ISCED 1–2) education degree (0.23 - 0.16 = 
7%). All the control variables have the expected sign and are highly significant: Hourly wages 
increase with education attainment, tenure, and age (at a decreasing rate). Specification (b) shows 
that the training wage premium is highly heterogeneous across countries: The incremental effects 
for country groups 2 and 3 are statistically significant at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Training premiums are highest in Austria, Germany, Greece, and Italy (19%) and are reduced by 
about half in France and Spain (19.3 - 10.4 = 8.9%). No training premium is found for Denmark, 
Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. For this last group of countries, the point 
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estimate for the training variable is negative (19.3 - 25.6 = -6.3%); however, the Wald test reported 
at the bottom of Table 2 on the joint significance of the training variable plus the incremental effect 
for group 3 suggests that this negative coefficient is not significantly different from zero (p-value 
0.17).  
 
Sensitivity analysis 
Attrition, transition out of employment and selection into training 
Our sample selection criteria require individuals to be employed in both waves. Earlier, we 
underlined that attrition between the first and second wave of SHARE is high; moreover, we 
showed that a non-negligible percentage of individuals employed in the first wave retires or 
becomes unemployed between the two waves. Attrition and transitions out of employment might 
thus severely affect our findings. To shed light on these issues, we perform a test for attrition bias 
(see Becketti et al., 1988). We select individuals employed in the first wave of SHARE (excluding 
those whose hourly wages could not be reconstructed and outliers). We split this sample into three 
groups including respectively individuals: a) not present in Wave 2 due to attrition, b) present in 
Wave 2 but not employed (retired or became unemployed between the two waves), c) employed in 
Wave 2, i.e. included in our estimation sample described previously. We then run a regression 
which explains (log of) hourly wages in Wave 1 by means of four “attrition” variables (see later), a 
dummy variable for having undertaken training in Wave 1 and the same set of control variables as 
in equation 1. The four “attrition” variables are a dummy variable equal to one if the individual 
belongs to group a) (“Not present in Wave 2”), a dummy variable equal to one if the individual 
belongs to group b) (“Not employed in Wave 2”) and two interaction terms between each of these 
dummy variables and the training dummy. Issues of attrition/sample selection bias are signalled by 
significance of the estimated parameters for these interaction terms, as well as by the joint 
significance of these interactions terms with the dummy variables “Not present in Wave 2”/“Not 
employed in Wave 2”, see Becketti et al., (1988).  
Table 3 reports results of this exercise, for the full sample and by group of countries. No clear 
evidence of problems stemming from attrition and/or transitions out of employment emerges for the 
full sample and for country groups 2 and 3. Results for country group 1, however, signal evidence 
of problems from both. For this country group, in fact, both interaction terms of the “attrition” 
variables are significant at 5% level; the p-value of the F-test for no joint significance of the 
interaction term plus constant for group “Not employed in Wave 2” is equal to 5.68% (while that 
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for group “Not present in Wave 2” is equal to 10.3%). In other words, among those who remain 
employed, trained workers had a 10.2% higher wage than untrained workers (point estimate of the 
training coefficient); conversely, among those who leave the sample due to attrition, the point 
estimate of the difference in wages between trained and untrained workers was equal to about -5.4% 
(=.102-.156). Among those who leave the sample due to exit from employment such a difference 
was even larger: about -21.1% (=.102-.313). A comparison between these two differences shows 
that the problem of transitions out of employment is more severe than that of attrition. Note that the 
group “Not present in Wave 2” is a mixed one – it may also include individuals who left 
employment.  
 
Table 3. Tests for attrition/sample selection bias - Dependent variable: log of hourly wages in 
Wave1 
 Full sample By country group: 
VARIABLES  
1  
(AT, DE, 
GR, IT) 
2  
(FR, ES) 
3  
(DK, SE, BE, 
NL, CH) 
     
Training 0.0134 0.102* -0.138 -0.0392* 
 (0.0254) (0.0528) (0.103) (0.0234) 
“Attrition” variables:     
Not present in Wave 2 0.0180 -0.000672 0.0477 0.0163 
 (0.0148) (0.0282) (0.0480) (0.0184) 
Not employed in Wave 2  -0.00453 0.0225 -0.0414 0.00667 
 (0.0204) (0.0379) (0.0705) (0.0262) 
Training * Not present in Wave 2 -0.0599 -0.156** 0.0375 0.0462 
 (0.0401) (0.0784) (0.154) (0.0426) 
Training * Not employed in Wave 2 -0.0853 -0.313** 0.482 0.0272 
 (0.0671) (0.130) (0.294) (0.0654) 
 
F-test H0: no difference including constant between employed in Wave 2 and group: 
Not present in Wave 2 (p-value) 0.250 0.103 0.523 0.181 
Not employed in Wave 2 (p-value) 0.375 0.0568 0.255 0.836 
     
Observations 3,742 1,022 341 2,379 
R-squared 0.422 0.436 0.537 0.347 
Note: OLS estimates; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Additional controls: Log tenure, 
age, age squared, dummy variables for female, public sector, ISCED educational groups, country of residence, sector, 
occupation and year of interview; Reference categories: employed in Wave 2, not undertaking training in Wave 1 
 
 
This analysis points out that our estimation sample excludes trained individuals with lower wages at 
the time of training. The sign of the bias created by this exclusion is not certain. In the extreme case 
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of equal return to training across workers regardless of their group (employed in Wave 2, Not 
present/employed in Wave 2), such exclusion would not create any bias. However, one may expect 
that individuals undertaking training and retiring would have (on average) had returns to training 
lower than those remaining employed. In the last case, exclusion of these individuals from the 
sample biases our results upward.  
The parameter estimates for the training dummy variable in Table 3 also suggest evidence of 
training endogeneity for country group 1. In Austria, Germany, Greece, and Italy – for which we 
find a training premium equal to 19.3%, see Table 2 - in fact, wages of trained workers were 10% 
higher (estimate significant at 10% level) than those of similar untrained workers at the time they 
undertake training. This indicates that training premiums found for this group of countries can be 
overestimated. The next subsection presents results of further checks on training endogeneity. 
Selection into training: cognitive abilities and childhood circumstances 
Earlier, we pointed out that the OLS estimates for training reported in Table 2 could be biased 
upwards due to unobserved ability. Cognitive abilities are an important component of abilities and 
are rewarded in the labour market with higher earnings (Case and Paxson 2008). In this subsection, 
we control for cognitive abilities in the econometric model and check to what extent the estimated 
training premium is sensitive to these changes.  
A ‘Cognitive Functioning’ module is included in SHARE that reports the results of simple tests of 
orientation in time, such as asking the interview date; verbal fluency, as in counting the number of 
words that can be named in a minute; memory, recalling as many words as possible from a 10-word 
list; and numeracy, testing daily life numerical calculations (for more details, see, e.g. Christelis et 
al. 2010). Starting from these tests, we build an index of cognitive abilities (Leist et al. 2013). This 
index is given by the average value of the (standardised) results of the verbal fluency, memory, and 
numeracy tests in SHARE Wave 1. We exclude tests of orientation in time since they show too little 
variation in our sample of workers. The higher the value of the index, the higher the cognitive 
abilities.  
Cognitive abilities, such as those measured in SHARE Wave 1, may be innate and partly the result 
of an ageing process. Many empirical studies indicate the important role of lifecycle decisions and 
factors (education, occupational choices, lifestyles, chronic diseases) in the process of skill 
formation (for a survey, see Mazzonna and Peracchi 2012). According to models of skill formation 
à la Cunha and Heckman (2008), however, the roots of cognitive abilities are found in the home 
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environment and parental influences in childhood. In the ‘Childhood Circumstances’ module, 
SHARELIFE includes a set of variables concerning individuals’ early life conditions. It has been 
postulated that these variables may suffer from recall bias, that is, individuals may not remember 
events far in the past so well. Havari and Mazzonna (2014) shows that these variables are 
characterised by a good level of internal and external consistency. From these, we select the 
following four: i) performance in math relative to other children in the same class (from one, 
denoting ‘much better’, to five, for ‘much worse’), ii) performance in language (same answer 
format as in i)), iii) the number of books at home (from one, for ‘none or very few’ – i.e. zero to 10 
books – to five, ‘enough to fill two or more bookcases’ – i.e. more than 200 books), and iv) the 
occupation of the main breadwinner in the household (ISCO one-digit groups). All these variables 
refer to the time when the individual was aged 10 (“initial conditions”). From i) and ii), we build an 
index for self-reported relative school performance (RSP index henceforth). The literature (e.g. 
Blackburn and Neumark 1992) has often used intelligence quotient scores as a proxy for 
unobserved ability when estimating wage equations in the absence of panel data (a so-called plug-in 
solution to the omitted variable problem in OLS regressions). Our RSP index takes on three possible 
values: two, if individuals report having performed better or much better than their schoolmates in 
both math and in their own language; one if individuals report having performed better or much 
better in either math or language; and zero otherwise. From iii) and iv), we build two dummy 
indicators of SES in childhood: few books at home (equal to one if the number of books was ‘none 
or very few’ to ‘enough to fill one shelf’ and zero otherwise) and breadwinner blue collar (equal to 
one for ISCO codes 6 to 9 and zero otherwise). 
We already documented sizeable attrition between SHARE Waves 1 and 2. Making use of 
SHARELIFE introduces additional attrition, since we need respondents to be interviewed in both 
Waves 1 and 2 and in Wave 3. Due to this, the sample size reduces from 2,312 (Waves 1 and 2) to 
about 1,700 observations (Waves 1 to 3). In the resulting sample, the cognitive abilities index varies 
quite substantially: It has a mean equal to about zero and a standard deviation of 0.71. It is 
significantly higher for trained workers (mean 0.23, s.e. 0.04) than for untrained workers (mean -
0.04, s.e. 0.02). The RSP index is also much higher for trained workers (mean 1.02, s.e. 0.04) than 
for untrained workers (mean 0.80, s.e. 0.02). A total of 32% of trained workers had few books at 
home in childhood, compared to 53% for untrained workers. Smaller differences between trained 
and untrained workers are observed when looking at whether the breadwinner at home was a blue 
collar worker (61% versus 65%). 
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Table 4 reports OLS estimates of alternative specifications estimated on the subsample of SHARE 
Waves 1 to 3. It separately displays results for all countries (left panel) and for the subsample of 
countries for which the sensitivity analysis reported in the previous subsection does not indicate 
problems of training endogeneity or attrition/sample selection bias, i.e. country groups 2 and 3 
(right panel). Given the above-described problem of attrition stemming from the use of 
SHARELIFE, we re-estimate our base specification without cognitive abilities measures on the 
resulting sample (specifications (a)). We then add to the model proxy variables for cognitive 
abilities and/or childhood circumstances (specifications (b-d)). 
 
Table 4. Training wage premiums - Robustness checks: controlling for cognitive abilities 
 All countries Country groups 2&3 
VARIABLES (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d) 
         
Training 0.069*** 0.065*** 0.056** 0.055** -0.029 -0.031 -0.027 -0.027 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Cognitive abilities Index  0.026*  0.008  0.052***  0.026* 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
No education (ISCED 0) -0.382*** -0.365*** -0.340*** -0.336*** -0.418*** -0.373*** -0.357*** -0.338*** 
 (0.064) (0.067) (0.078) (0.080) (0.053) (0.055) (0.060) (0.061) 
Primary and lower 
Secondary education 
(ISCED 1-2) 
-0.234*** -0.229*** -0.198*** -0.198*** -0.237*** -0.220*** -0.198*** -0.192*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) 
Upper and post-Secondary 
education (ISCED 3-4) -0.181*** -0.177*** -0.156*** -0.154*** -0.172*** -0.159*** -0.136*** -0.129*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
         
Initial conditions:         
Relative school 
performance index   0.022* 0.021*   0.046*** 0.042*** 
   (0.012) (0.012)   (0.012) (0.012) 
Few books at home   -0.067*** -0.066***   -0.033 -0.030 
   (0.021) (0.021)   (0.020) (0.020) 
Breadwinner blue collar   -0.055*** -0.054***   -0.058*** -0.058*** 
   (0.020) (0.020)   (0.020) (0.020) 
         
         
Observations 1,788 1,783 1,702 1,698 1,314 1,309 1,249 1,245 
R-squared 0.456 0.457 0.463 0.463 0.383 0.390 0.397 0.399 
Source: (a) SHARE Wave 1-2, (b-e) SHARE Wave 1-2-3 
Note: OLS estimates; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Country groups 2&3: FR, ES, DK, 
SE, BE, NL, CH; Additional controls: Log tenure, age, age squared, dummy variables for female, public sector country of 
residence, sector, occupation and year of interview; Reference category: tertiary education (ISCED 5-6) 
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We first comment results for all countries. The coefficient for training increases somewhat when the 
base specification is estimated on this smaller sample: 0.069 (cf. with 0.063 in Table 2). 
Specification (b) includes the cognitive abilities index as an additional explanatory variable (5 
observations have missing values for the cognitive abilities index). The estimated parameter for 
training decreases only negligibly (0.065). Specification (c) includes “initial conditions” in place of 
the cognitive abilities index variable. The estimated coefficient for the RSP index (0.022) implies 
that individuals with the highest index value (= 2) earn about 5% higher hourly wages than those 
with the lowest one (= 0). Having had few book at home is associated with much lower hourly 
wages (-6.7%) than having had more books. A similar result is found for being the child of a blue 
collar worker (-5.5%) instead of a white collar worker. These findings are in line with those of 
Flores et al. (2013b), who quantify the association between childhood SES and annual earnings over 
the lifecycle, using SHARELIFE. The estimated training premium decreases to some extent, but not 
dramatically (from 6.9% to 5.6%), once initial conditions are controlled for. Interestingly, the 
estimated formal education premiums – measured by the coefficients of the ISCED educational 
level dummy variables – also decrease once childhood SES variables and RSP index are controlled 
for. Finally, specification (d) includes both the cognitive abilities index and initial conditions. As 
expected, the coefficient for the cognitive abilities index loses significance (cf. specifications (b) 
and (d)); the coefficient for training is almost the same as in specification (c). 
Results for country groups 2 and 3 (Table 4; right panel) show that the coefficient for training is not 
significantly different from zero, regardless of whether or not cognitive abilities measures and/or 
childhood circumstances are included in the model (cf. specifications (a) to (d)). A similar result of 
no training wage premium for these country groups is obtained by estimating on SHARE Waves 1 
and 2 a model - alike specification (b) in Table 2 – in which the training dummy is interacted with a 
dummy for belonging to country group 2 or 3 (results available upon requests).   
On the one hand, the above-illustrated findings provide credibility to the OLS estimate of the 
average training premium (6.3%) reported in Table 2. Nonetheless, many unobserved factors may 
easily lead to biased OLS estimates. Noncognitive abilities such as perseverance, motivation, time 
preference, risk aversion, self-control, and preference for leisure, for instance, are known to have a 
direct impact on wages, even after controlling for education (see Cunha and Heckman 2007 and 
references therein). We do not have any measure of noncognitive abilities in SHARE and we are 
not able to estimate a panel data model that would allow us to get rid of time-invariant unobserved 
factors. Empirical studies such as that of Bassanini et al. (2007), who estimate both OLS and fixed 
effects models, typically show that the latter result in much lower (or even no) returns to training 
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than the former models do. On the other hand, findings of Table 4 highlight that such average 
training premium of 6.3% is determined by the high premium found for Austria, Germany, Greece, 
and Italy for which we previously reported evidence of possible endogeneity and attrition/self-
selection biases.  
 
 
Conclusions 
There is a growing consensus among the research and policy community on the importance of 
training investments in keeping older workers’ skills updated. Despite the interest in these issues, 
the empirical evidence on the effect of training on older workers’ productivity is scarce, as are 
suitable data. Using wages as a proxy for productivity, this paper investigates the relationship 
between training undertaken by European older workers and their wages, adopting an international 
perspective by relying on SHARE data.  
We find that, for employees aged 50 and above residing in one of the 11 European countries 
analysed, undertaking training activities is associated with 6.3% higher wages. This premium is 
sizeable and is similar to that of attaining an upper or post-secondary degree instead of a primary or 
lower-secondary degree. Training wage premiums are highly heterogeneous across countries: they 
are highest in Austria, Germany, Greece, and Italy (19%) and are about half that in France and 
Spain (9%). No premium is found for Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland. Furthermore, we provide descriptive evidence that older workers undertaking training 
have lower probabilities to become unemployed or to retire.  
We performed a wide sensitivity analysis to check whether our results are affected by attrition, 
sample selection (exclusion of individuals retiring or becoming unemployed between waves) and 
unobserved ability biases. In terms of attrition and sample selection, we found that our estimation 
sample for the highest training premium countries excludes trained individuals with lower wages at 
the time of training. The problem of transition out of employment is more severe than that of 
attrition. The sign of the bias created by this exclusion is not certain. One may expect that 
individuals undertaking training and retiring would have had returns to training lower than those 
remaining employed. In this case, exclusion of these individuals from the sample biases our results 
upward.  
The importance of unobserved ability bias is not clear. On the one hand, results seem to be robust to 
controlling for cognitive abilities (as measured at old age) and for their early life determinants. On 
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the other hand, for the highest training premium countries we found evidence of training 
endogeneity: individuals undertaking training had on average higher wages at the time of the 
training. It is likely that unobserved ability is determining both training participation and wages. 
This indicates that training premiums found for this group of countries can be overestimated. 
Unfortunately, we are not able to handle the issue of training endogeneity with the data at our 
disposal: SHARE data does not provide information on noncognitive abilities nor allows us to 
estimate panel data models.  
Attrition, sample selection and unobserved ability biases may severely affect our findings for the 
highest training premium countries. For the remaining countries, we do not find evidence of the 
above-mentioned problems. For these last countries, there is no evidence of a training wage 
premium.  
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